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Abstract. It is well-known that for several natural decision problems
no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist. This has motivated recent
research on designing variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as
‘redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) payments’) that gener-
ate reduced deficit. With this in mind, we study sequential mechanisms
and consider optimal strategies that could reduce the deficit resulting un-
der the simultaneous mechanism. We show that such strategies exist for
the sequential pivotal mechanism of the well-known public project prob-
lem. We also exhibit an optimal strategy with the property that a max-
imal social welfare is generated when each player follows it. Finally, we
show that these strategies can be achieved by an implementation in Nash
equilibrium. All proofs can be found in the full version posted in Comput-
ing Research Repository (CoRR), http://arxiv.org/abs/0810.1383
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Mechanism design is concerned with designing non-cooperative games in which
the participating rational players achieve the desired social outcome by report-
ing their types. Among the most commonly studied mechanisms are the ones
in the Groves family that are based on transfer payments (taxes). For the case
of eﬃcient decision functions they are incentive compatible, i.e., they achieve
truth-telling in dominant strategies. The special case called pivotal mechanism
(sometimes also called VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism) is addition-
ally pay only (i.e., each player needs to pay a tax) and hence feasible (i.e., the
generated deﬁcit is negative or zero).
It is well-known that for several problems incentive compatible mechanisms
cannot achieve budget balance (which states that the generated deﬁcit is zero),
see, e.g., Chapter 23 of [14]. This has motivated recent research in designing
appropriate instances of Groves mechanisms that generate a reduced deﬁcit (or
equivalently higher social welfare). These modiﬁcations are termed as ‘redistri-
bution of VCG payments’. In fact, they are variants of feasible Groves mech-
anisms. Notably, [3] and [9] showed that a deﬁcit reduction is possible for the
case of Vickrey auctions concerned with multiple units of a single good. On the
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other hand, [1] recently showed that no such deﬁcit reduction is possible in the
well-known case of the pivotal mechanism for the public project problem.
This research direction motivates our study of sequential Groves mechanisms,
in particular sequential pivotal mechanism, in which players move sequentially.
We face then a new situation since each player knows the types reported by the
previous players. Sequential Groves mechanisms apply to a realistic situation in
which there is no central authority that computes and imposes taxes and where
the players move in a randomly chosen order.
1.2 Contributions
We show here that natural strategies exist in the sequential pivotal mechanism
for the public project problem that generate larger social welfare than truth-
telling. We also exhibit a strategy such that the social welfare is maximized when
each player follows it. Finally, we show that the resulting sequential mechanisms
yield an implementation in Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the vector of the latter
strategies is also Pareto optimal.
To properly describe the nature of the introduced strategies we consider two
concepts. An optimal strategy guarantees a player the maximum utility under
the assumption that he moves simultaneously with the players who follow him.
It also guarantess the player at least the same utility as truth-telling, under the
assumption that the other players are truth-telling. In turn, a socially optimal
strategy yields the maximal social welfare among all optimal strategies.
These concepts allow us to analyze altruistic behaviour of the players in the
framework of sequential pivotal mechanism. By altruistic behaviour we mean
that the players do not only care about their own utility, but also about the
utility of the others.
1.3 Related Work
Ever since the seminal paper of [5] mechanism design for public goods has re-
ceived a huge attention in the literature. We mention here only some represen-
tative papers the results of which provide an appropriate background for our
work.
Both the continuous and discrete case of public goods have been studied. The
former situation has been in particular considered in [8], where a taxation scheme
has been proposed which leads to a Pareto optimal solution that can be realized
in a Nash equilibrium. Sequential mechanism design for public good problems
has been considered in [6], where a “Stackelberg” mechanism was proposed that
combines optimal Bayes strategies with dominant strategies.
Here we study the discrete case. The situation when the decision is binary
(whether to realize a public project or not) has been studied in [11], where bal-
anced but not incentive compatible sequential mechanisms have been proposed.
These mechanisms can be realized in an undominated Nash equilibrium and in
subgame perfect equilibrium. Many aspects of incentive compatible mechanisms
for public goods have been surveyed in [4].
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The consequences of sequentiality have also been studied in the context of
private contributions to public goods and in voting theory. In particular, [16] has
studied the behavior of players depending on the position in which they have
to take a decision and [7] has explored the relationship between simultaneous
and sequential voting games. More recently, [12] has studied the problem of
determining the winner in elections in which the voting takes place sequentially.
Our focus on maximizing social welfare is related to research on altruistic
behaviour of the player. This subject has been studied in a number of papers
in game theory, most recently in [13], where several references to earlier litera-
ture on this subject can be found. Finally, in a recent work, [2], we carried out
an analogous analysis for two feasible Groves mechanisms used for single item
auctions: the Vickrey auction and the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism.
1.4 Plan of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall Groves mech-
anisms and the pivotal mechanism by focusing on decision problems. Then, in
Section 3, we introduce sequential decision problems, in particular sequential
Groves mechanisms.
In the remaining sections we study the sequential pivotal mechanism for the
public project problem. In Section 4 we exhibit an optimal strategy that in a
limited sense simultaneously maximizes players’ ﬁnal utilities and another op-
timal strategy that maximizes the social welfare among all vectors of optimal
strategies. Finally, in Section 5, we clarify the status of the optimal strategies in-
troduced in Section 4 by showing that their vector is a Nash equilibrium w.r.t. ap-
propriately deﬁned preference relations on the strategy vectors, and by providing
a corresponding revelation-type result. We conclude by mentioning some open
problems in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
We brieﬂy recall the family of Groves mechanisms here. In this section we follow
[10]. Let D be a set of decisions, {1, . . ., n} be the set of players with n ≥ 2,
and for each player i let Θi be a set of his types and vi : D × Θi → R be his
(initial) utility function .
A decision rule is a function f : Θ→D, where Θ := Θ1 × · · · × Θn. It is
called eﬃcient if for all θ ∈ Θ and d′ ∈ D
n∑
i=1
vi(f(θ), θi) ≥
n∑
i=1
vi(d′, θi).
We call the tuple (D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) a decision problem .
Recall that a direct mechanism is obtained by transforming the initial
decision problem (D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) as follows:
– the set of decisions is D × Rn,
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– the decision rule is a function (f, t) : Θ →D × Rn, where t : Θ→ Rn and
(f, t)(θ) := (f(θ), t(θ)),
– each ﬁnal utility function for player i is a function ui : D×Rn×Θi → R
deﬁned by ui(d, t1, . . ., tn, θi) := vi(d, θi) + ti.
We call then
∑n
i=1 ui((f, t)(θ), θi) the corresponding social welfare and refer
to t as the tax function .
A direct mechanism with tax function t is called
– (dominant strategy) incentive compatible if for all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
and θ′i ∈ Θi
ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) ≥ ui((f, t)(θ′i, θ−i), θi),
– budget balanced if
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) = 0 for all θ,
– feasible if
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ,
– pay only if ti(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ and all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}.
Each Groves mechanism is obtained by using the tax function t := (t1, . . ., tn),
where1 for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
ti(θ) :=
∑
j =i
vj(f(θ), θj) + hi(θ−i),
with hi : Θ−i →R an arbitrary function.
Finally, we recall the following crucial result.
Groves Theorem. Consider a decision problem with an eﬃcient decision rule
f . Then each Groves mechanism is incentive compatible.
A special case of Groves mechanism is the pivotal mechanism , which is a
pay only mechanism obtained by hi(θ−i) := −maxd∈D
∑
j =i vj(d, θj).
Direct mechanisms for a given decision problem can be compared w.r.t. the
social welfare they entail. More precisely, given a decision problem
(D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f)
and direct mechanisms (determined by the sequences of tax functions) t and t′
we say that t′ welfare dominates t if
– for all θ ∈ Θ
n∑
i=1
ui((f, t)(θ), θi) ≤
n∑
i=1
ui((f, t′)(θ), θi),
– for some θ ∈ Θ
n∑
i=1
ui((f, t)(θ), θi) <
n∑
i=1
ui((f, t′)(θ), θi).
In this paper we analyze the following well-known decision problem, originally
due to [5], and extensively discussed in the economic literature, see, e.g. [14,10].
1 Here and below
∑
j =i is a shorthand for the summation over all j ∈ {1, . . ., n}, j = i.
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Public project problem
Consider (D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f), where
– D = {0, 1} (reﬂecting whether a project is cancelled or takes place),
– for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, Θi = [0, c], where c > 0,
– for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, vi(d, θi) := d(θi − cn ),
– f(θ) :=
{
1 if
∑n
i=1 θi ≥ c
0 otherwise
In this setting c is the cost of the project, cn is the cost share of the project for
each player, and θi is the value of the project for player i. Note that the decision
rule f is eﬃcient since
∑n
i=1 vi(d, θi) = d(
∑n
i=1 θi − c).
It is well-known that for no n ≥ 2 and c > 0 an incentive compatible direct
mechanism for the public project problem exists that is budget balanced, see,
e.g. [14, page 861-862]. It is then natural to search for incentive compatible
direct mechanisms that generate a smaller deﬁcit than the one obtained by
the pivotal mechanism. However, the following optimality result concerning the
pivotal mechanism, recently established in [1], dashed hope.
Theorem 1. In the public project problem there exists no feasible incentive com-
patible direct mechanism that welfare dominates the pivotal mechanism. 
Our aim is to show that when the original setting of the public project problem is
changed to one where all players announce their types sequentially in a random
order, then the deﬁcit can be reduced.
3 Sequential Decision Problems
In this section we introduce sequential decision problems. For notational sim-
plicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that players sequentially report
their types in the order 1, . . ., n. To capture this type of situations, given a de-
cision problem D := (D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f), we assume that successively
stages 1, . . ., n take place, where in stage i player i announces a type θ′i to the
other players. After stage n this yields a joint type θ′ := (θ′1, . . ., θ′n). Then each
player takes the decision d := f(θ′).
We call the resulting situation a sequential decision problem or more
speciﬁcally, a sequential version of D. Note that in a sequential decision prob-
lem a central planner may not exist and decisions may be taken by the players
themselves. Each player i knows the types announced by players 1, . . ., i − 1,
so that he can use this information to decide which type to announce. To prop-
erly describe this situation we need to specify what is a strategy in this setting.
A strategy of player i in the sequential version of D is a function
si : Θ1 × . . .×Θi →Θi.
In this context truth-telling , as a strategy, is represented by the projection
function πi(·), deﬁned by πi(θ1, . . ., θi) := θi.
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From now on, we consider a direct mechanism
D := (D × Rn, Θ1, . . ., Θn, u1, . . ., un, (f, t))
and mainly focus on Groves mechanisms.
We assume that in the considered sequential decision problem each player
uses a strategy si(·) to select the type he will announce. We say that strategy
si(·) of player i is optimal in the sequential version of D if for all θ ∈ Θ and
θ′i ∈ Θi
ui((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi) ≥ ui((f, t)(θ′i, θ−i), θi).
Call a strategy of player j memoryless if it does not depend on the types of
players 1, . . ., j − 1. Then a strategy si(·) of player i is optimal if for all θ ∈ Θ it
yields a best response to all joint strategies of players j = i under the assumption
that players i + 1, . . ., n use memoryless strategies or move jointly with player
i. In particular, an optimal strategy is a best response to the truth-telling by
players j = i.
A particular case of sequential decision problems are sequential Groves mech-
anisms. The following direct consequence of Groves Theorem provides us with a
simple method of determining whether a strategy is optimal in such a
mechanism.
Lemma 1. Let (D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) be a decision problem with eﬃcient
decision rule f . Suppose that si(·) is a strategy for player i such that for all
θ ∈ Θ, f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i). Then si(·) is optimal in each sequential
Groves mechanism (D × Rn, Θ1, . . ., Θn, u1, . . ., un, (f, t)). 
In particular, when the decision rule is eﬃcient, the truth-telling strategy πi(·)
is optimal in each sequential Groves mechanism.
We are interested in maximizing the social welfare. This motivates the fol-
lowing notion. We say that strategy si(·) of player i is socially optimal in the
sequential version of D if it is optimal and for all optimal strategies s′i(·) of player
i and all θ ∈ Θ we have
∑n
j=1 uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) ≥
∑n
j=1 uj((f, t)(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj).
Hence a socially optimal strategy of player i yields the maximal social welfare
among all optimal strategies, under the assumption that players i + 1, . . ., n use
memoryless strategies or move jointly.
Consider now a sequential version of a given direct mechanism
(D × Rn, Θ1, . . ., Θn, u1, . . ., un, (f, t))
and assume that each player i receives a type θi ∈ Θi and follows a strategy
si(·). The resulting social welfare is then
SW (θ, s(·)) :=
n∑
j=1
uj((f, t)([s(·), θ]), θj),
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where s(·) := (s1(·), . . ., sn(·)) and [s(·), θ] is deﬁned inductively by [s(·), θ]1 :=
s1(θ1) and [s(·), θ]i+1 := si+1([s(·), θ]1, . . ., [s(·), θ]i, θi+1).
In general, if player i assumes that he moves jointly with players i + 1, . . ., n
he will choose an optimal strategy. And if additionally he wants to maximize the
social welfare, he will choose a socially optimal strategy (if it exists). In the next
section we shall see that for the public project problem a sequence of socially
optimal strategies can be found for which the resulting social welfare is always
maximal. In general, we only have the following limited result.
Lemma 2. Consider a direct mechanism (D×Rn, Θ1, . . ., Θn, u1, . . ., un, (f, t))
and let sn(·) be a socially optimal strategy for player n. Then
SW (θ, (s′−n(·), sn(·))) ≥ SW (θ, s′(·))
for all θ ∈ Θ and vectors s′(·) of optimal players’ strategies.
Proof. Directly by the deﬁnition of a socially optimal strategy. 
4 Public Project Problem
In what follows, we focus on the special case of sequential pivotal mechanisms
for the public project problem. First, the following theorem gives an optimal
strategy for player i that may diﬀer from truth-telling. Part (ii) shows that,
under certain natural conditions, this strategy simultaneously maximizes the
ﬁnal utility of every other player.
Theorem 2. Let D be a public project problem. Let
si(θ1, . . ., θi) :=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
θi if
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i < n,
0 if
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i = n,
c if
∑i
j=1 θj ≥ c
be strategy for player i. Then
(i) si(·) is optimal for player i in the sequential pivotal mechanism,
(ii) for all θ ∈ Θ and θ′i ∈ Θi such that si(θ1, . . ., θi) = θi and f(θ′i, θ−i) =
f(θi, θ−i) we have for all j = i
uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) ≥ uj((f, t)(θ′i, θ−i), θj).
In part (ii) θ−i are the types submitted by players j = i and θi is the type
received by player i. So part (ii) states that if strategy si(·) of player i deviates
from truth-telling (si(θ1, . . ., θi) = θi) and the players who follow i use memo-
ryless strategies (so in particular, the types they submit do not depend on the
type submitted by player i), then player i simultaneously maximizes the ﬁnal
utility of the other players (and hence the social welfare). This happens under
the assumption that player i submits a type that does not alter the decision to
be taken.
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Table 1. Pivotal mechanism
player type submitted type tax ui
A 110 110 −10 0
B 80 80 0 −20
C 110 110 −10 0
Table 2. Sequential pivotal mechanism
player type submitted type tax ui
A 110 110 0 10
B 80 80 0 −20
C 110 300 −10 0
When each player follows strategy si(·), always the same decision is taken as
when each player is truthful, independently on the players’ order. Additionally,
by part (ii) of Theorem 2 with θ′i = θi, social welfare weakly increases. The
following example shows that sometimes a strictly larger social welfare can be
achieved.
Example 1. Assume that c = 300 and that there are three players, A, B and C.
Table 1 illustrates the situation in the case of pivotal mechanism. In Table 2 we
assume that the players submit their types in the order A, B, C. Here the social
welfare increases from −20 to −10. 
However, as Table 2 shows, budget balance does not need to be achieved. The
following result shows that an order can always be found that yields budget
balancedness.
Theorem 3. Let D be a public project problem with the sequential pivotal mech-
anism. For all c > 0, n ≥ 2 and θ ∈ Θ there exists a permutation of players such
that when each player i follows strategy si(·) of Theorem 2, budget balance is
achieved.
Proof. (Sketch). Recall that in the pivotal mechanism, given the sequence of
types θ, a player i is called pivotal if ti(θ) = 0. First we show that not all players
can be pivotal. Then we show that the desired permutation is the one in which
the last player is not pivotal. 
For instance, in Example 1 when the order is A, C, B or C, A, B, the decision
is taken with no taxes incurred, i.e., budget balance is then achieved.
In Theorem 2(ii) we seem to be maximizing the social welfare. However, this
is not the case because we assume there that each player submits a type that
does not alter the decision to be taken. In fact, strategy si(·) of Theorem 2 is
not socially optimal.
The following theorem provides a socially optimal strategy that in some cir-
cumstances yields a higher social welfare than the above strategy.
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Theorem 4. Let D be a public project problem. Let
si(θ1, . . ., θi) :=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
θi if
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i < n,
0 if
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i = n,
0 if
∑i
j=1 θj = c, θi >
c
n and i = n,
c otherwise
be a strategy for player i. Then
(i) si(·) is socially optimal for player i in the sequential pivotal mechanism,
(ii) for all θ ∈ Θ and vectors s′(·) of optimal players’ strategies,
SW (θ, s(·)) ≥ SW (θ, s′(·)),
where s(·) is the vector of strategies si(·).
The remarkable thing about the above strategy si(·) is that when
∑n
j=1 θj = c
and θn > cn , player n submits type 0, as a result of which the project does not
take place. To illustrate this situation reconsider Example 1. When the play-
ers submit their types sequentially in order A, B, C following the above strat-
egy si(·), then player C submits 0. The resulting social welfare is 0 as opposed
to −10 which results when all players follow strategy si(·) of Theorem 2
(see Table 2). This also shows that the latter strategy is not socially optimal.
However, in general strategy si(·) of Theorem 4 does not need to ensure budget
balance.
Example 2. Suppose that there are three players, A, B, and C, whose true types
are 60, 70, and 250, respectively, while c remains 300. When the players submit
their types following strategy si(·) of Theorem 4, we get the situation summa-
rized in Table 3.
Table 3. Sequential pivotal mechanism
player type submitted type tax ui
A 60 60 0 −40
B 70 70 0 −30
C 250 300 −70 80
Here the same decision is taken as when each player is truthful and in both
situations the deﬁcit is −70. 
On other other hand, part (ii) shows that when we limit ourselves to optimal
strategies and each player follows the introduced strategy si(·), then a maxi-
mal social welfare results. The restriction to the vectors of optimal strategies is
necessary. Indeed, Table 3 of Example 2 shows that when the order is A, B, C
and each player follows the strategy si(·) of Theorem 4, then the resulting social
welfare is 380−300−70 = 10. However, when player B submits 300, then player
C pays no tax and the resulting social welfare is higher, namely 380− 300 = 80.
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5 Comments on a Nash Implementation
The sequential mechanisms here considered circumvent the limitations of the
customary, simultaneous, Groves mechanisms. This and the fact that we max-
imize social welfare by using strategies that deviate from truth-telling requires
some clariﬁcation. First of all, we can explain these sequential mechanisms by
turning them into simultaneous ones as follows.
We assume that each player i receives a type θi ∈ Θi and subsequently submits
a function ri : Θ1 × . . . × Θi−1 →Θi instead of a type θ′i ∈ Θi. (In particular,
player 1 submits a type, i.e., r1(·) ∈ Θ1.) The submissions are simultaneous. Then
the behaviour of player i can be described by a strategy si : Θ1 × . . .×Θi →Θi
which when applied to the received type θi yields the function si(·, θi) : Θ1×. . .×
Θi−1 →Θi that player i submits. Then θ and the vector s(·) := (s1(·), . . ., sn(·))
of strategies that the players follow yield an element [s(·), θ] of Θ, where, recall,
[s(·), θ]1 := s1(θ1) and [s(·), θ]i+1 := si+1([s(·), θ]1, . . ., [s(·), θ]i, θi+1).
Given a decision problemD := (D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) and two strategies
si(·) and s′i(·) of player i in the sequential version of D, we write
si(·) ≥d s′i(·) iﬀ for all θ ∈ Θ
vi(f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi) ≥ vi(f(s′i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi).
We write si(·) >d s′i(·) if additionally one of these inequalities is strict, and we
write si(·) =d s′i(·) if all these inequalities are equalities.
Note that si(·) ≥d s′i(·) for all strategies s′i(·) of player i iﬀ strategy si(·) of
player i is optimal in the sequential version of D.
Next, we deﬁne for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} a preference relation i on the vectors
of players’ strategies by writing
s(·) i s′(·) iﬀ si(·) >d s′i(·) or
(si(·) =d s′i(·) and
for all θ ∈ Θ, vi(f([s(·), θ]), θi) ≥ vi(f([s′(·), θ]), θi)).
We now say that a joint strategy s(·) is a Nash equilibrium in the sequential
version of D if for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and all strategies s′i(·) of player i we have
(si(·), s−i(·)) i (s′i(·), s−i(·)).
The following result clariﬁes the status of the strategies introduced in Theorems
2 and 4.
Theorem 5. Let D be a public project problem.
(i) Each of the vectors s(·) of strategies deﬁned in Theorems 2 and 4, respec-
tively, is a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding sequential version of the
pivotal mechanism.
(ii) The vector s(·) of Theorem 2 is Pareto optimal in the universe of opti-
mal strategies, in the sense that for all θ ∈ Θ the resulting social welfare
SW (θ, s(·)) is maximal among all vectors of optimal players’ strategies.
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This result shows that the improvement in terms of the maximization of the
social welfare over the Groves mechanism is achieved by weakening the imple-
mentation in dominant strategies (see Groves Theorem) to an implementation
in Nash equilibrium (in the universe of optimal strategies).
The above deﬁnition of the i relation uses the >d relation to ensure that in
the deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium the deviations to non-optimal strategies are
trivially discarded. This ruling out of non-optimal strategies is necessary. Indeed,
when θi > cn , with i < n, and
∑n
j=1 θj < c, then player’s i ﬁnal utility increases
from 0 to θi − cn when he deviates from any of the two strategies considered in
Theorem 5 to the strategy
si(θ1, . . ., θi) :=
{
0 if θi ≤ cn
c otherwise.
Recall now that the well-known revelation principle (see, e.g., [15]) states that
every mechanism can be realized as a (simultaneous) direct mechanism in which
truth-telling is the optimal strategy. We now show that using any Nash equi-
librium (s1(·), . . ., sn(·)) of Theorem 5 we can construct a revelation-type si-
multaneous mechanism in which the vector (π1(·), . . ., πn(·)) of the projection
functions forms a Nash equilibrium. (Recall that the πi(·) function corresponds
in the sequential setting to truth-telling by player i.) This mechanism is con-
structed using the following preference relations ∗i on the vectors of players’
strategies:
s′(·) ∗i s′′(·) iﬀ
(s1(·) ◦ s′1(·), . . ., sn(·) ◦ s′n(·)) i (s1(·) ◦ s′′1(·), . . ., sn(·) ◦ s′′n(·)),
where strategy si(·) ◦ s′i(·) of player i is deﬁned by
(si(·) ◦ s′i(·))(θ1, . . ., θi) := si(θ1, . . ., θi−1, s′i(θ1, . . ., θi)).
Theorem 6. Let D be a public project problem. The vector (π1(·), . . ., πn(·)) of
projection strategies is a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding sequential version
of the pivotal mechanism, where we use the preference relations ∗1, . . .,∗n.
Proof. Note that for all j ∈ {1, . . ., n}, sj(·) ◦ πj(·) = sj(·). Then
(πi(·), π−i(·)) ∗i (s′i(·), π−i(·)) iﬀ (si(·), s−i(·)) i (si(·) ◦ s′i(·), s−i(·)),
so the result holds by Theorem 5(i). 
6 Concluding Remarks
As already mentioned, no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist for the
public project. We have investigated here to what extent the unavoidable deﬁcit
can be reduced when players move sequentially. By focusing on socially optimal
strategies we have incorporated into our analysis altruistic behaviour of the
players.
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The results here established hold for the sequential pivotal mechanism. Some
of them, but not all, can be generalized to sequential Groves mechanisms. More
speciﬁcally, the strategies introduced in Theorems 2 and 4 are also optimal in
arbitrary sequential Groves mechanisms. The reason is the following observation.
Note 1. Fix an initial decision problem and consider two Groves mechanisms
(with tax functions) t and t′. A strategy of player i is optimal in the sequential
version of t iﬀ it is optimal in the sequential version of t′.
How to generalize the remaining claims of Theorems 2 and 4 to other sequen-
tial Groves mechanisms remains an interesting open problem.
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